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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

OF CARTS AND HORSES:
ORGANIZING REMEDIES FOR THE CLASSROOM

ELAINE W. SHOBEN*
INTRODUCTION
Consider the situation of the Remedies professor two weeks before classes
start, when it is time to prepare a syllabus for the course. It is an emotional
time for a variety of reasons, mostly because the summer or winter break is
almost over, and it is frustrating how many things that the professor planned to
accomplish were not done. The reality of the upcoming classes hits hard when
the syllabus is due. The dull thud in the professor’s brain at that moment does
not promote much thought or creativity. Easy options at this point are to use
the syllabus from last year if there is one, or simply to follow a casebook’s
order of presentation to make a fast syllabus. A professor’s failure to give
much thought to the issue of organizing Remedies on the syllabus means the
loss of a significant opportunity to frame the subject meaningfully for the
students and to pique their interest in it.
The syllabus—or, more precisely, the order of presenting major groups of
remedies—is where the students’ approach to the subject is formed. Does one
start with damages, injunctions, restitution, or one of the miscellaneous
subjects in the course, such as contempt, attorneys’ fees, jury trials, or
declaratory judgments? The first remedy studied is likely to be perceived as the
most important and/or the most complex. It also sets the tone for the course as
one that either continues where earlier courses such as Contracts and Torts left
off, or as one that presents new concepts.
The casebooks taken as a whole do not help to answer the question because
they are split on the issue of how to organize Remedies for study. This Essay
poses some questions designed to promote thought about the order of
presentation because the issue affects student perception of the subject, and its
exploration helps professors to understand their own approach to Remedies.
This Essay also modestly proposes an answer or two about how to make a
sensible syllabus.

* Judge Jack and Lulu Lehman Professor, Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas; Edward W. Cleary Professor Emerita, University of Illinois, College of Law.
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I. DAMAGES FIRST?
The first question is: Why not be conventional and start the course with
damages? Notably, some prominent texts begin with damages.1 This approach
is easily justified on the premise that because damages are at the top of the
“hierarchy of remedies,” they must be addressed first. Under the inadequacy
rule,2 an equitable remedy is not permissible unless the legal remedy is
inadequate, so it makes sense to study this favored remedy first.
There are two reasons why damages may not make the best starting place
for a Remedies course. First, modern scholarship has challenged the
underlying premise of the remedial hierarchy.3 Why perpetuate it by making
damages the part of the course that comes first? Second, damages is one of the
few topics to which students have typically had some exposure in other courses
prior to arriving at Remedies. First-year classes in Contracts, Torts, and
Property often address some aspect of damages related to those subjects. The
students usually have had exposure to expectancy in Contracts, often in some
depth. In Torts, most students receive at least passing exposure to personal
injury damages, and sometimes even to concepts like reduction of future losses
to present value. Torts classes almost always give some introduction to
punitive damages as well. In Property, students may have learned about
diminution in value of the land as a measure of damages and cost of restoration
as another.
This limited exposure is not to say that the students have actually studied
these concepts in the depth that they will study them in Remedies. The point is
that they have enough of a background to understand what a damages award

1. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed. 2010); EMILY SHERWIN, THEODORE EISENBERG & JOSEPH R. RE, AMES,
CHAFEE, AND RE ON REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS (2012).
2. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ELAINE W. SHOBEN & MICHAEL B. KELLY, PRINCIPLES OF
REMEDIES LAW 8–9 (2d ed. 2011).
3. See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 39 (1978) (inadequacy rule reflects
an unjustified remedial hierarchy subordinating injunctions to damages); R. Grant Hammond,
Interlocutory Injunctions: Time for a New Model?, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 240, 276 (1980)
(inadequacy rule is grossly overstated and is a contemporary shibboleth of the law); Douglas
Laycock, Injunctions and the Irreparable Injury Rule, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1065, 1071 (1979) (book
review) (inadequacy rule is best understood as a “tie-breaker”); Douglas Laycock, The Death of
the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 692 (1990) (irreparable injury rule
functionally gone); Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an
Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 346, 358 (1981) (pliable inadequacy rule allows changes in
response to policy but grants excessive discretion); Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Transformed:
Preliminary Injunctions to Require the Payment of Money, 70 B.U. L. REV. 623, 650 (1990)
(inadequacy rule does not meet modern needs). But see Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden &
Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent
Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 215–16 (2012) (effect of Supreme Court’s eBay decision is
to favor damages in more than just patent cases).
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might be and thus can understand the concept of the inadequacy requirement
for equitable remedies if the instruction starts there.
One could argue that it is precisely because students have learned a little
bit about damages that one must start the Remedies class with that topic in
order to demonstrate how little they actually know. That is a fair point, and
illustrated by an informal experiment that I accidentally conducted at the
University of Illinois College of Law a number of years ago.
This accidental experiment revealed the gap between what the students
thought they had studied in other courses and what the professors thought that
they had taught them. This difference between what professors think they are
teaching and what students think they are learning can be called the “gap.”
This gap is usually noted in faculty lounges in the context of students denying
that they have ever heard of some concept when the professors of the
prerequisite course swear they spent weeks on it. But I uncovered quite a
different aspect of the gap—when students believe they have studied
something that the professors say was mentioned only in passing. One might
even call this a “reverse gap.”
I discovered this reverse gap one year when, in a fit of enthusiasm, I was
determined to tailor the syllabus of my Remedies course to address previous
omissions in the students’ education. On the first day of class, I distributed to
the class a detailed questionnaire listing all the possible topics that we might
cover during the semester and asked them to assess the depth of their existing
knowledge on each topic. Students could indicate, for example, whether
“punitive damages” was something they had studied “extensively” in a prior
class, only “moderately” studied, or “never” studied. If they marked
“extensively,” the form asked them to indicate the class where the study had
occurred.
To be completely honest, my survey was the result not only of my
enthusiasm for designing a good course collaboratively with the students, but
also in part because I needed the students to tell me what was going on in the
curriculum. There had been changes in the curriculum that affected the
Remedies course without my knowledge. This development was the result of a
well-meaning approach by an associate dean who let professors avoid the
cumbersome process of faculty approval for new courses by using a catchall
course known as “Recent Topics in the Law” for which endless new sections
were made in the name of a new class. This practice meant that new classes
were not vetted by the curriculum committee and the faculty, and thus, their
existence was a surprise to most people when the schedule appeared. As a
result, I learned by accident that a new course on Econometrics in the
Courtroom was using material taken directly from my Remedies class. Other
courses like Advanced Civil Procedure had also developed to include material
that I had previously covered in my class. Remedies is a huge subject, and one
cannot begin to cover everything possible in a three-unit course, so it is good to
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know where the curriculum is strong and weak on these topics. Because the
associate dean was trying to save faculty time (always a laudable goal) by
streamlining the development of new courses, there was no coordination of
coverage.
Returning to the story of the survey, I gathered the information about the
students’ prior exposure to topics that I could cover in Remedies and tailored
my syllabus to give greater coverage to those topics that were not covered
extensively elsewhere in the curriculum. I was surprised, however, at some of
the topics that students said they had studied “extensively.” Although it was
not surprising that the class on Products Liability had a large unit on punitive
damages, it was surprising that Land Use had an extensive study of
injunctions. When I asked the professor of that class about it, he expressed
great surprise. “We didn’t study injunctions, except that a few cases involved
injunctions. I didn’t say much about it except to explain the procedural
context.” I explored further and received similar responses from other
professors whose students thought they had learned more than the professors
thought they had taught. One is reminded once again that a little knowledge is
a dangerous thing.
After this experience, which was quite a few years ago, I abandoned the
survey approach. At least, I quit surveying the students. Sometimes I asked my
colleagues about the coverage in their courses. It was useful to know, for
example, that the Civil Procedure courses covered federal topics with respect
to jury trials, but no state jury trial issues. I could then tailor the study of jury
trials in Remedies to focus on the state issues and simply to remind the
students of the famous federal cases. In fairness to the students, it did not make
sense for my survey to ask them how much they had studied “jury trials”
because they would not know that there were more issues than the Seventh
Amendment ones they had studied.
This account raises a different issue: Should we have a final session in law
school that tells students at length what they have NOT studied? One hopes
that by graduation, each new lawyer has the skills to research the unknown, but
have we equipped students to know what is unknown?
Returning more squarely to the topic of whether to begin a Remedies
course with damages, another question is whether students have already
become jaded on that topic and need a fresh topic to generate excitement. For
example, it is in the first year that students typically become very animated on
the damages issue in the Contracts case Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining
Co.,4 but by the time they get to Remedies, it is usually hard to get any
discussion of it. The issue in this case is whether the defendant contractor
should be compelled to keep its promise to the plaintiff farmers to restore the

4. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
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land to its prior conditions after the strip-mining operation was complete. The
defendant entered and mined the land under contract and then abandoned the
ravaged earth contrary to the promise to restore it. The question before the
court was whether the measure of damages in the landowners’ claim for breach
of contract should be the diminution in the value of the land (very little) or the
cost of restoration in fulfillment of the promise (several times larger than the
value of the entire farm even if restored).5
Peevyhouse held that the breaching defendant would not be required to pay
the cost of restoration because the cost would be greater than the diminution in
the value of the land.6 Although professors typically try to focus students on
the principle of avoiding economic waste, first-year students are often adamant
that Peevyhouse was wrongly decided. That passion subsides by the time they
study Remedies—or perhaps law school simply pounds the passion out of
students. One possibility for rekindling interest is to try to shift student thought
in the direction of different remedies—other than damages—in this fact
situation. What about a restitutionary claim to recoup their savings from the
breach or an injunction to require the mining company to restore the land as
promised? Once students have studied those topics, they will learn that such
claims are unlikely to succeed,7 but the fresh questions can renew interest in
the problem.8 That moves our discussion of the syllabus forward to
consideration of restitution or injunctions as opening topics.
II. RESTITUTION FIRST?
Under the theory that one should start with the material to which students
have had little or no exposure in other courses before Remedies, the next
question is whether Remedies should start with restitution. To answer that
question, one needs to consider another: Is it desirable to reduce class size
dramatically during the first week?
Restitution has an ill-deserved reputation as a dull and difficult topic. It is,
in fact, quite engaging—at least to scholars on the topic. For most students
(and a remarkable number of faculty) the topic holds little appeal. This attitude
is only furthered by any study of restitution that has occurred in first-year
Contracts. It is usually part of the excess of material that is crammed into the
last two weeks of that first-year class, and students typically find that the topic
only adds to the stress of that period of time.

5. Id. at 111.
6. Id. at 114.
7. See 3 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION §
12.19(2)–(3) (2d ed. 1993).
8. This fact situation can make a good theme throughout the study of Remedies, and can
even make a good final exam question.
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Although restitution is not as dull as its reputation, it is nonetheless a
challenging subject upon first exposure. The best argument for beginning the
Remedies course with restitution is that it gives the students ample time to
absorb the material before the final exam.
I once chatted with a colleague who had taken a class in restitution many
years before from the late, great Professor Palmer. My colleague told me that
this noteworthy scholar of restitution9 devoted the entire first day of class to
Felder v. Reeth.10 This 1929 case involved a dispute between a gold miner and
a supply store in Alaska.11 The case was tried at roughly the same time as
Charlie Chaplin’s famous movie The Gold Rush,12 invoking the image of the
starving gold miner in the snowy wilderness of Alaska. The romance of the
case goes no further than that coincidence.
This famous old case explains the nature of claims involving waiver of tort
and suit in assumpsit. Procedurally, the defendant gold miner needed a
restitutionary device in order to counterclaim against the contract claim that the
supply store brought against him. This procedural problem is no longer
relevant in modern pleading, but it explains the history of the case. The miner
wanted to counterclaim with a tort claim because the supply store had
wrongfully seized his property. He had bought some hydraulic mining
equipment in San Francisco and intended to take it to mining camp, but left it
by the banks of the river below camp because the water was too low to move
it.13 Meanwhile, the miner incurred a large debt from the local supply store,
prompting that store to seize the hydraulic equipment and sell it for $550.14
Later the store sued the miner for his large debt. The miner tried to
counterclaim for the conversion of the equipment. He prayed for $10,000 as
the special value of the equipment to him at the camp.15 Although the usual
measure of damages for conversion is the fair market value at the time and
place of conversion, the miner argued here that there was no such market. The
trial court accepted this theory, but awarded only $8000 as the special value of
the equipment to the miner.16
The conversion action failed on appeal because the miner had to plead a
contract counterclaim for the antiquated procedural reason previously noted.
Therefore, to achieve a contract claim, the miner waived the tort and sued in
assumpsit. The court found this restitutionary claim valid and next considered

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978).
34 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1929).
Id. at 745.
THE GOLD RUSH (Charles Chaplin Production 1925).
Felder, 34 F.2d at 745.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 746.
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the measure of recovery under the assumpsit claim. The opinion traces the
history of claims in assumpsit when the tort is waived, and noted that they are
generally based upon the old writ for “money had and received” when
conversion is waived in favor of the implied contract claim. This writ was used
to create the fiction that the wrongdoer was acting as the agent of the owner
when converted property was resold. The wrongdoer was thus obliged to pass
along the money from the resale, which in this case would be the $550
obtained by the store by the sale of the equipment.17
The court further held, however, that restitutionary claimants in this
context may sue under another writ that would change the measure of
recovery—the writ of “goods sold and delivered.”18 Under the theory of this
fiction, at the moment the wrongdoer converted the equipment, the law implied
a contract to pay the owner the fair market value of the goods.19 Given this
election, the miner could obtain greater recovery with the sales fiction. But,
given that there was no fair market value for this equipment at the time and
place of conversion, what is the fair market value of the goods? The court
allowed the value at the nearest market, which presumably is San Francisco,
minus the cost of transportation to that market.20
A final point of interest (at least to a restitution scholar) about this case is
why the cost of transportation subtracted rather than added. The key is that the
focus of restitution is on the gain to the wrongdoer, not the loss to the
claimant.21 Because the gain was the possession of property that could be sold
at the nearest market, the transportation to that market would be a transaction
cost that must be subtracted. It was irrelevant under this theory of recovery that
the store actually made a resale to someone who was in a remote place outside
a “market” for the goods. That is how this famous old case concludes.
I realize that I have told too much about this case and have thus risked
losing readers of this modest Essay along the way. The reason for the details is
to illustrate poignantly what it would be like to be in a class that studied this
case on the first day. I asked my colleague how the students in Professor
Palmer’s class on restitution reacted to beginning the course with this complex
and rather arcane case. Predictably, enrollment (or, at least, attendance) was
smaller after that introduction. In fairness to Professor Palmer, the class had to
start with a case in restitution because the entire subject of the course was
restitution. Courses exclusively in restitution were common in the law school
curriculum at one point, and they created special challenges for professors. I
began my teaching career by being assigned to teach a course in restitution,

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Felder, 34 F.2d at 746–47.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 748.
See id.
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and I have offered my advice elsewhere22 on how to entice students to
appreciate the subject.
In the modern law school, the course that covers restitution is typically the
course in Remedies, and I do not recommend that one starts a Remedies course
with Felder v. Reeth, or any restitution case, unless the object is to reduce the
size of one’s class. The benefits of class reduction are not to be ignored—
notably including fewer exams to grade—but this Essay proceeds on the
assumption that Remedies professors entered into law teaching because they
like teaching and want students to enjoy their classes.
Restitution, therefore, does not appear to be the best starting place for a
course on Remedies. Having eliminated both damages and restitution, there are
two remaining candidates for the beginning of a syllabus—injunctions and
miscellaneous topics.
III. INJUNCTIONS FIRST?
This Essay has rejected damages and restitution as appropriate ways to
start a Remedies course, so the next question is: Should the course start with
injunctions? This approach does not suffer from the drawbacks of the other
approaches—familiarity or fatigue—but it does have its own drawback,
specifically that it feels like one is putting the cart before the horse.
The sequence conundrum is that the inadequacy rule says that equity does
not grant relief if the remedy at law is adequate, so how can one teach
injunctions (an equitable remedy subject to the rule) before teaching damages
(the legal remedy that is most commonly the “adequate” one)? Despite the
scholarly complaint about the remedial hierarchy,23 the inadequacy rule
persists.24 Therefore, the disadvantage of studying injunctions first is that it is
difficult to discuss the adequacy of the legal remedy before studying damages.
This problem is not insurmountable in any school where students have
gotten basic exposure to damages issues in Torts, Property, and, most likely,
Contracts. My own experience is that students in Remedies already have had
exposure to some of the basic issues with damages. For that reason, I have not
found that it is hard to teach injunctions first, and my own co-authored
casebook25 follows that approach, as do several other excellent texts.26

22. Elaine W. Shoben, Spinning Restitution: From Cauliflower to Coconut, 36 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1027 (2003).
23. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
24. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
25. ELAINE W. SHOBEN, WILLIAM MURRAY TABB & RACHEL M. JANUTIS, REMEDIES:
CASES AND PROBLEMS (5th ed. 2012).
26. See CANDACE S. KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, JEAN C. LOVE & GRANT S. NELSON, EQUITABLE
REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2011); DAVID I.
LEVINE, DAVID J. JUNG & TRACY A. THOMAS, REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (5th ed. 2009);
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It was suggested earlier in this Essay that one could revisit the Peevyhouse
fact situation and pose the question whether the court should order an
injunction.27 This approach has the advantage of approaching the inadequacy
rule in a familiar and inherently interesting context. If the students did not
study this case in Contracts, one can assign the case and work from there. The
key question is whether an injunction would be appropriate under the facts of
Peevyhouse, and in my experience the conversation on this question can be
quite lively.
In class discussion on this question, some students are likely to articulate
the belief that an injunction is an appropriate kind of “sanction” here because
the defendants did not keep their promise to restore the land after strip mining
it. Such comments provide the professor with a good opportunity to discuss the
difference between civil remedies designed for the benefit of the plaintiff
versus the state’s interest in “sanctions” in criminal or civil form. The purpose
of the private civil action is not to punish wrongdoers except when it is
appropriate to award punitive damages. The goal is to provide an appropriate
remedy to satisfy the legitimate interests of the private plaintiff.
Other students may argue that the remedy at law is inadequate in
Peevyhouse because the damages for diminution in the value of the land were
low. Such comments provide a good opportunity to explore the concept of
“inadequate” as something other than objecting to the measure or amount of
damages. The plaintiff landowners would be happy with money damages here,
and the fact that they wanted more money does not make the remedy
inadequate in the sense of the inadequacy rule. Damages are inadequate under
the rule when, for example, money cannot replace what might be lost, or when
recurring conduct would require a multiplicity of actions for damages.28 There
is nothing special about the Peevyhouse situation that would make damages an
inadequate remedy. To the contrary, it is only the measure of those damages
that is at issue in the case.29
A good injunction case to compare to the Peevyhouse fact situation is
Thurston Enterprises, Inc. v. Baldi.30 The Baldi case arose from an abuse of an
easement when the defendant drove heavy trucks through the plaintiff’s drivein theater and did significant damage to the speaker aisles. During the offseason for the theater, the owner Baldi gave permission for Thurston to drive
the trucks across the theater in order to access a construction project in an
adjoining lot. The easement specified the route for the construction vehicles to

RUSSELL L. WEAVER, DAVID F. PARTLETT, MICHAEL B. KELLY & W. JONATHAN CARDI,
REMEDIES: CASES, PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES (2d ed. 2010).
27. See supra text accompanying notes 4–8.
28. See, e.g., Thomas v. Weller, 281 N.W.2d 790, 793 (Neb. 1979) (repeated trespasses).
29. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 111 (Okla. 1962).
30. 519 A.2d 297 (N.H. 1986).
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follow, but many trucks deviated from the route and damaged the aisles.31 The
district court originally ordered the contractor to repair the damage, but this
injunction was reversed on appeal because the plaintiff had an adequate
remedy at law—damages for the cost of repair.32
In class discussion, some students usually perceive the defendant as a “bad
guy” and express sympathy with the district court’s order requiring him to fix
the plaintiff’s speaker aisles (“He broke it, so he should fix it.”). To reply
simply that the injunction was a violation of the inadequacy rule is not a
satisfactory answer, although the opinion does not say much more. The
injunction here is best understood as an inappropriate remedy because it would
be impractical and difficult to supervise. Moreover, this cost to judicial
efficiency is not offset by any great societal gain—the kind of gain one sees
from ordering the removal of an unconstitutional institutional condition or
even from ordering child support for one child, even though these orders are
also difficult orders to supervise.
Why would an injunction be difficult to supervise for a case like Baldi
(and, by extension, Peevyhouse)? It is useful to explore the practical effect of
enforcing an injunction as opposed to giving Baldi the money to repair the
damage to the drive-in himself. If Baldi receives money, he will arrange for the
repairs and get them done exactly as he wants them. In contrast, if Thurston is
responsible for assuring that the repairs are done, his interest would be to cut
costs wherever possible. Moreover, he would have no incentive to make sure
that the work is done quickly and well. If Baldi has any complaints about the
speed or quality of the repairs that Thurston undertakes, Baldi would address
them to the court. If Thurston is recalcitrant, the court would have to continue
supervision and may have to use the contempt power. The potential cost in
terms of judicial resources is high. From a societal point of view, the advantage
of a money judgment in such a situation is its simplicity and easier
enforceability.
The efficient disposition—with damages rather than an injunction—of
cases such as Baldi makes it possible to spend judicial resources on other
matters, such as the supervision of injunctions addressing unconstitutional
conditions like racially segregated schools or prisons with unconstitutionally
cruel conditions. The most common kind of case on which our society spends
judicial resources is ongoing supervision in child custody and support.33 The

31. Id. at 299.
32. Id. at 300, 302.
33. See Nat’l Ctr. For State Courts, Domestic Relations Caseloads Prove Difficult to
Dispose, CT. STAT. PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Domestic-Relations/DomesticDis
pose.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2013); see also LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 17:01 (1997) (stating that custody modification requests are more numerous than
initial filings); J. Thomas Oldham, New Methods to Update Child Support, in CHILD SUPPORT:
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supervision of such cases is inefficient, but it expresses our society’s value on
the subject of the case. In contrast, the abuse of an easement, as in Baldi, or the
violation of a contract, as in Peevyhouse, receive damages rather than an
injunction because these disputes are relatively less compelling. Although as a
society we could choose different values, our current values are reflected in the
law of remedies as fully as they are reflected in the substantive law.
Finally, it is useful at this point to foreshadow future issues in the study of
damages by noting that recovery of the cost of repair puts Baldi in the same
position financially as the award of an injunction to repair. He could have been
awarded the diminution in the value of the land, like the Peevyhouse award. If
there is commercial growth in the surrounding area (as suggested by the
construction on the adjoining property), it is entirely possible that there was no
diminution in the value of the land at all. If the fair market value of the land
reflects that its “best use” is for new stores rather than a drive-in theater,
should the damages be limited to reflect that fact? Should the measure of
damages reflect Baldi’s intended use (or the Peeveyhouse farmers’ intentions)?
If so, then what happens when the case concludes and the landowners change
their minds to do the economically wiser course of action? Is the solution to
change remedies law to permit injunctions in such a situation solely for the
purpose of encouraging the parties to negotiate a settlement that will account
for these factors in a way that a damages rule cannot?34
This discussion of the inadequacy rule as a prerequisite to an injunction
permits a rich exploration of the interplay of remedies. It is possible to have
this discussion at the beginning of the course because of the students’ previous
introduction to damages in Contracts. The advantage of beginning with
injunctions is that the two topics—damages and injunctive relief—can be
discussed together immediately.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS FIRST?
The third-year Remedies course is likely to be the only place in the
curriculum where students encounter a variety of miscellaneous topics that
greatly enrich a legal education, including attorneys’ fees, contempt, and
declaratory judgments. Also in this list is the topic of jury trials, although
students often learn about federal jury trial rights in Civil Procedure, but that
course rarely covers state jury trial rights.

THE NEXT FRONTIER 128, 128–29 (J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli eds., 2000)
(describing requests for cost of living adjustments to child support).
34. See generally Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a
Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984) (concluding that “specific
performance is more likely than any form of money damages to achieve efficiency in the
exchange and breach of reciprocal promises”).
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These topics are all worthy of starting a course in Remedies, and contempt
in particular often captures the students’ attention as a topic worthy of learning
in law school because it can sometimes appear quickly as a problem in a
courtroom when an attorney does not have the luxury of researching it back in
the office.
Attorneys’ fees is another topic that has become complex and is worthy of
study in a Remedies course because the availability of attorneys’ fees as a
remedy can effect whether cases are brought at all in areas such as civil rights,
employment discrimination, environmental challenges, and privacy claims.
These cases often have low monetary recoveries, such that it is not
economically viable to bring such a claim unless an organization funds the suit
or unless a victorious claimant receives attorneys’ fees as part of the remedy.
Similarly, the declaratory judgment is a very useful tool for many clients,
and there is no other place in the curriculum that is likely to cover it. This
remedy has limited availability in both federal and state courts, but when it is
used correctly, it can prevent further litigation at an early stage of a dispute.
These topics are all good ones, and could start a course on Remedies,
except for the fact that it seems odd to start a subject by studying its
miscellaneous parts. The three main categories of remedies—damages,
injunctions, and restitution, in alphabetical order—are more important, and
therefore, need to be featured more centrally in the organization of the class.
Miscellaneous topics such as the ones listed here can be interspersed in logical
places, or grouped at the end of the course. One advantage of putting them at
the end of the course is that it is good not to put restitution at the very end of
study. It takes a while to absorb the concepts in restitution, so it makes sense
not to cram it into the end of the semester when students have little time to
digest the topic and when they are already overwhelmed with the proximity of
final exams. The miscellaneous topics ably serve this function. Moreover,
these topics can be expanded or contracted as necessary to accommodate the
amount of time left in the semester, and thus, it works extremely well to put
them at the end of the syllabus.
CONCLUSION
All previous sections of this Essay have been characterized by question
marks, and this section—Conclusion—should probably have a question mark
with it too because it is difficult to draw a firm conclusion. There is no perfect
solution to the question of how to organize a class on Remedies. On the one
hand, it is logical to begin with damages because that is the “horse” that still
draws the remedial cart, but many professors have found that the advantages in
starting with injunctions overcome the horse/cart issue.
The one thing that casebooks all agree is to put restitution after the study of
both damages and injunctions, regardless of the order of those two. Such
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universality should be a caution to any new professor who is tempted to go
rogue by trying restitution first.
Regardless of where one starts, when all three major categories of
remedies are finally covered, the students can get the “big picture”35 of the
subject. Choosing a starting place sets the tone for the class, and may have a
subtle effect on how students perceive the relative importance of various
remedies, but at the end of the semester it may not matter where one started—
as long as it was not with restitution.

35. The law school community owes to the late former Chancellor and Dean John E.
Cribbet, of the University of Illinois College of Law, the perfection of this expression with
respect to studying law. See Ronald R. Volkmer, The Complicated World of the Electing Spouse:
In re Estate of Myers and Recent Statutory Developments, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 121, 131 n.69
(1999).
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